The second Sino-Japanese War compiled by Si Mi Au

The fundamental aim of the Tokugawa regime in 1868 was to build a united, prosperous and powerful nation state. Gradually it began to progress towards the domination and colonization of vast tracts of the Asian continent so as to contribute to its immediate strategic interests.

An expansive foreign policy could be used, on the other hand, to distract discontents at home and the acquisition of an empire provided one of the indicators of great power status. It became apparent that the Japanese empire was set up as security ring(s) surrounding the ‘core area' of its mainland.

The second Sino-Japanese War

To Japan, there is no consensus as to when the second Sino-Japanese War began. Was it in 1931 with the ‘Manchurian Incident' or the ‘China Incident' in 1937 ?The Japanese leftists saw the Japanese War or the Fifteen Year War as a colonial conquest beginning with the annexation of Manchuria in 1931.

Nevertheless, most historians place the beginning of the war on the Battle of Lugou Bridge on July 7, 1937 while Chinese historians place the starting point on the Mukden Incident of September 8, 1931.

Why Manchuria is the triggering point?

The nineteenth century was the heyday of imperialism. China and Japan were forced to submit to western domination under the ‘unequal treaties'. The Opium War of 1839-42 in which the Chinese forces were demolished by the British. The government in Peking was forced by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 to open Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo, Foochou and Amoy to British trade and residence, and to cede to Britain the island of Hong Kong. Other western powers negotiated similar treaties later year(s) giving them the same rights in the five mainland ports.

One foreign power advanced by land was the Russians. Sensing China's weakness and internal problems, they penetrated in northern Manuchuria which is a region in Northeast Asia, the traditional homeland of the Manchus. In the treaties following the war of 1858-60, the Russians detached the maritime provinces of eastern Manchuria and added them to their empire, plus the port of Vladivostok, which they had founded on the Pacific Coast.

Manchuria came under strong Russian influence with the building of the Chinese eastern railway through Harbin to Vladivostok (Pacific naval base of Russia). The Russians occupied Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. The English, wishing to check the Russian expansion in Asia, concluded an alliance treaty with Japan in 1902. No agreement was reached with Russia over their troops staying in Manchuria and the Japanese attacked the Russians on Liaodong and at Mukden as well as from Korea. This is known as Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

The Treaty of Portmouth was signed in 1905. Korea was recognised as being under Japanese hegemony and the Russian possession on Liaodong Peninsula were ceded to Japan as well as the railway which went from Lushun all the way up the Liaodong Peninsula onto the interior of Manchuria above Mukden.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had become the dominant foreign power in Southern Manchuria though Manchuria was formerly a Russian sphere of expansion ever since the Treaty of Tientsin in 1860. Japan concluded an agreement (Treaty of Portmouth, 1905) with Russia which divided the two countries spheres of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Why the location of Manchuria was so strategic?

The establishment of the formal empire by Japan had been begun by acquiring Taiwan in 1895, appropriating southern Sakhalin in 1905 and establishing a protectorate over Korea in 1905, followed by its annexation five years later. Such treaty of annexation signed in 1910 was declared to promote ‘the common wealth of the two nations' and to guarantee ‘permanent peace' in Asia.

At the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan won most-favoured nation status in China and ten years later, at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, she was able to establish a protectorate over Korea and extend her economic interests in south Sakhalin and the South of Manchuria.

Japan, like Germany, believed that it was essential to have guaranteed access to the raw materials and markets necessary for industrial success and military vitality. The Japanese leaders saw Russia weakened by famine and China divided by the struggle between Chiang Kai Shek and the Communists. The key to Japan's policy in China was claimed as gaining access to the raw materials there available, to secure a ready market for her goods and to ensure that the resources of that country be attuned to her economic and strategic needs in the event of war against Russia.

The operation of the Manchurian Railway by the Japanese from the Liaodong Peninsula onto Manchuria became a vehicle to control Manchuria. By acquiring treaty rights Japan's government had stationed forces in Manchuria, protecting its railroad and other interests. Japan laid the South Manchurian Railway since 1905 which operated in Japanese-occupied Manchuria. The South Manchurian Railway Company developed soy beans, mineral resources and brought them to Japan by this railway. It also built hotels, schools, libraries etc. for Japanese immigrants.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895 granted the Japanese sovereignty in Liaotung Peninsula (to the north-west of Korea) and a number of islands including the Chinese province of Taiwan. Port Arthur, built up by the Chinese near the tip of the peninsula, was a valuable naval base within easy range of the China coast and occupying one edge of the Gulf of Pohai with Tientsin on its other western shore. A fleet based at Port Arthur could seal off access to north China and blockade much of the entire coast, while adjacent Dairen was a valuable commercial base.

The Japanese Army had powerful forces in neighbouring Korea which they formally annexed in 1910 after victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The neutrality of the area, the ability of Japan to defend its colony in Korea has to be maintained and such explained why the Japanese steadily expanded their influence in Manchuria during the 1920s.

All along, what had saved China from a complete colonial takeover was primarily the rivalry among the powers, including Japan. None of them were willing to see any one country become dominant in China. But when Japan was impatient, intending to extract new concessions, naval bases, leased territories and ‘spheres of influence, it started to stir up conquests.

Japan's Imperialism

Japan was forced open by the Americans in 1853. Though they themselves felt that Japan was a special place, even a superior one, they recognised that the westerners had much of value to offer them. They quickly saw that Japan was far behind the west in almost every respect and could benefit from cultural borrowing. This was the same set of attitudes which had underlain the Japanese borrowing from Chinese civilization from the 8th century onwards. They realised that the new sources of western strength had to be adopted as the only way of defending the country against threat. They were free of the cultural arrogance of China.

So under the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese tried to build new western-style strength which could ultimately keep Japan from becoming just another victim of western imperialism. The ‘unequal treaties' which had been forced onto Japan, special privileges for foreigners, extra-territoriality, and an artificially low tariff of 5 percent,, were all to be tolerated. From the early years of Meiji, there was determination to bring about the revision of the treaties and an acceptance of Japan as a diplomatic equal rather than a ‘backward' nation which could be treated like an inferior.

Overseas Aggression

The Japanese government felt that it was part of the new Japan's destiny to express its strength in East Asia, and as early as 1872, there were plans in Japan to invade Korea, and an actual expedition to Taiwan in 1874, followed by an expedition to Korea in 1876 to open Korean ports to Japanese trade.

In 1894 the war was fought between China and Japan over Korea when there was a revolt against the Korean king. The Japan army routed the Chinese forces, occupied the whole of Korea and moved out to invade Manchuria. The Japanese ships sank a large part of the Chinese fleet in a battle off the Korean west coast and damaged or routed the rest. The victorious Japanese dictated the terms of the Treaty of Shiminoseki which ended the war and among other provisions extracted a heavy indemnity from China which was three times the annual income of Peking.

The Russians had persuaded the Germans and the French after the signing of the Treaty of Shiminoseki to advise Japan to give up Liaotung. Faced with such pressure, Japan was obliged to do so, but accepted a considerable increase in the indemnity paid by China. There was massive indignation in Japan over this ‘humiliation'. Within three years, Russia took over Liaotung and Port Arthur, the Germans seized Tsingtao in Shantung, the French Kuangchou Bay south of Canton, the British Wei-hai-wei in Shantung (which had originally been part of the Japanese claims) and the United States the Philippines and Hawaii.

Japan concluded from all the experience that force was a very effective instrument of foreign policy. In 1902 Japan and Britain signed an Anglo-Japanese alliance of mutual support; Japan accepted the existing treaty system in China and Britain acknowledged that Japan had a special interest in Korea. This was Japan's first agreement with a western power on equal terms and it gave a great boost to morale – the western powers would remain neutral if Japan attacked Russia.

Japan, basing themselves on the Western model of imperialism, took over Korea and Taiwan in 1895, replaced the Russians as the dominant power in Chinese Manchuria. It felt that as far as being fed by new power of steam and steel, its country and civilization was ‘superior' to other ‘backward' nations where industrialization had not been spread and these need Japanese civilization to offer them ‘blessings'. It followed the western path of industrialization and consequent military power over the rest of East Asia, whose development was lagging.

Japanese had always though of themselves and their country as ‘special'. They now felt that they had a ‘civilizing mission' to perform.

New Order

There was a statement made by the Prime Minister of the Japanese Government, Konoe Fumimaro in November 1938 which reads –

‘What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order that will insure the
permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our
present military campaign.

A tripartite relationship ….. between Japan, Manchukuo and China …….
is the way to contribute toward stabilisation of East Asia and the progress
of the world.'

Most Japanese felt that their cause of aggression was just. They aimed to accomplish in China. Feeling that China was hopelessly backward and disorganized, Japan should show to its elder brother, China, the way to progress. Most Japanese came to believe that Japan, given its brilliant success, had acquired the ‘right' to straighten out China.

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

There was a clear appeal in the Japanese ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' with Japan providing the technical and managerial skills and the rest of East Asia providing the raw materials and labour. The idea of Japanese cultural superiority over other Asian races had been expounded as early as the late nineteenth century and steadily grew in intensity until the end of World War II. When in 1905, Japan became the first Asian country to defeat a Western power, namely Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, this bolstered Japan's confidence in its destiny to lead Asia.

Economic reasons played a large role in Japan's announcement of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940. Japan required East Asian raw materials such as oil from the Dutch East Indies and rubber from Indochina in order to keep its manufacturing industry and military in China supplied. The U.S. embargo of oil and steel shipments to Japan and other restrictions on raw materials shipments by Western nations pushed the Japanese leaders to seek sources in Asian countries to ensure Japanese self-sufficiency. The other Asian countries in the Co-Prosperity Sphere also would provide Japan with export markets for its manufactured goods and with land for its surplus population.

In addition to cultural and economic factors, Japan's international political aspirations also led to this formation. Since the late nineteenth century, Japanese leaders believed they had just as much right as Western powers to acquire and maintain colonies in Asia.

Japan considered colonies to be a basic prerequisite to achieving international prestige and becoming a first-rate country. Series of international affronts to Japanese pride and status provided fuel to Japanese militaristic sentiments such as rejection by the western countries for Japanese' request at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) to have a racial equality clause included in the League of Nations Covenant; passing in 1924 the Japanese Exclusion Act to shut off Japanese immigration into the US. This eventually led to Japan attacking the Western powers to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In short, Japan started the war on the ground of seizure of territory. The Russo-Japanese war (1904-5) was a conflict that grew out of the rival imperialist ambitions of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. Japan began gradually by biting off pieces by pieces, first Taiwan, then Manchuria. Rhoads Murphey commented in his book ‘ East Asia: A New History' that ‘the Japanese had become captives of their illusions: of Japan as all-powerful and all-competent, of China as hopelessly backward, weak and disunified, needing and even wanting Japanese direction'.

Japanese terror tactics had failed to persuade the Chinese to surrender while China's regional topography helped to stall Japanese efforts to advance.

Why the War has to be fought

Japan emerged from its feudal past only after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Started with a market economy, caste differences were abolished; farmers owned their own land; people free to buy property and monopolies abolished in favour of free enterprise. As the focus was to build a powerful country, government had to support strategic industries needed by a strong army. To complete the goals of ‘rich country, strong army', the Japanese economy would have to grow and develop rapidly, especially in industry which could support the military.

As a result, the new government started to subsidize heavy industries such as iron, steel, armaments and shipbuilding all along western lines. New banking facilities were established to expedite commerce, a tax system which was relatively easy on business and the development of a sound currency system – all underlay the boom development of industrialisation.

Much of Japan's industrial wealth was concentrated in a few big companies. Its pattern was – an intricate network of bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders who promoted industrial growth through strategic policies, government subsidies and mutually beneficial deals.

On the other hand, the pursuit of empire (started in the late 19th century) was an impulse to exercise available power – the power made possible by modern ships, railroads and weaponry. Japan's regional expansion before the First World War had been remarkable. Through the Treaties that ended the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan became a colonial power, with Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin and a number of island groups under its formal control. It had earned recognition from the western powers by its token participation in the First World War.

Japanese government was in the hands of the Elder Statesmen (Genro). Most powerful families exercised influence behind the scene.The Choshu family dominated the army and the Satsuma family dominated the navy. In the 1920s politics in Japan continued to be dominated by conservative leaders, aristocrats, big business, the military and landlords, none of them responsive to popular needs or sentiments. They opposed to change or to efforts to correct the economic inequality which had been accentuated by wartime prosperity for a few. Industrial workers were exploited and peasants had never shared in economic achievements.

Political parties had not been an important part of the Japanese system and the Meiji effort at development had been a national one which requiring a united people pursuing agreed goals. All Japanese understood that it was urgently necessary for the country's defense and its escape from the humiliation of the unequal treaties. Aided by its small size, the concentration of its population, the long tradition of direction by those on top, development, modernization etc. national effort and goal could be gathered in momentum.

The annexation of Manchuria marked a crucial turning point in Japanese political history. The governments were led by ‘national unity' cabinets. Dominated by the military, they re-asserted a sense of national unity and built up the authority of the state. Throughout 1930s, the armed forces played an increasingly prominent role in Japanese politics.

Social Unrest

The government was blamed as it did not put efforts to improve the lot of factory workers and the urban poor. Patriotic societies grew – some opposed the existence of parliament, some opposed what they saw as the corrupting influence caused by money and industrial wealth. Some ‘chivalrous patriots' were willing to use violence to intimidate anyone they saw as willing to weaken the Constitution. Some tended toward opposition to arms reduction and to dislike the concessions made by Japan at the signing of the agreement at the Washington Conference. They were suspicious of the League of Nations.

Economic Recession

Competition from abroad, vanished during World War I, had returned after the war. Exports declined and imports increased. Following World War I, Japan experienced financial panic, upward spiral in prices. Riots protesting the steep rise in rice had taken place in 1918, subsequently put down by the army. The depth of the depression (1929-31) was met by Japanese exports fell by half, unemployment rose to three million and workers' incomes plummeted. Silk prices fell dramatically. A year of bumper harvests was followed by one of widespread crop failure, and many starved while others were reduced to begging or to eating bark.

Japan began to industrialize and as a result its population expanded and became more urban. It needed both to import food and to make its own agriculture more efficient. Since the world economy showed its extreme vulnerability and unreliability, the effects of the world depression fed sentiment in favour of Japan creating its own dependent sphere in Manchuria and China, to add to what it already controlled in Korea and Taiwan free of the need to pander to western influence. Chinese trade surely facilitated the development of the modern Japanese economy. Unemployment suggested that many could find jobs in the military, for the greater glory and the greater good of the country.

Manchuria or better still, China, an outlet

Japan dominated the foreign investment scene in Manchuria, and put heavy investment on development projects like The South Manchurian Railway, linking the port of Dairen with Harbin on the east-west Chinese Eastern. Agriculture along the line was commercialised with access to markets; wheat and soy beans were shipped to Japan, via Dairen as well as into world markets. Nearly a million Japanese subjects lived in Manchuria, although most of them were Koreans. Mining projects were also developed along the new rail routes, shipping coal and iron to Japan but also forming the basis of a big, new iron and steel industry centred in the Mukden area, while dams were built on many Manchurian rivers to provide hydroelectric power and irrigation.

Manchuria, a fertile and productive region in southern part of China, was then made a Japanese colony. By 1936, Japanese firms accounted for approximately 40 percent of all the mechanised cotton yarn spun in China and almost 60 percent of the mechanised cotton cloth that was woven in China. The Japanese had been able to displace the British from the Chinese textiles market. China became a market and a production base for Japanese textile firms. Furthermore, in the last quarter of the 19th century, Japan primarily imported food from China. Roughly three-quarters of Japan's imports from China by value were agricultural products.

The sufferings of the depression tended to increase the militarists' insistence on foreign expansion. The government funnelled money to the army and navy. Opposite voices against the truly dangerous policies were muttered but the military grip on government had become unbreakable. Those who questioned the supremacy or divinity of the emperor were under fire. Most Japanese accepted what was happening, although many were disturbed over the ascendance of the military.

At the end of 1936, Japan always admiring the German model, signed an anti-Comintern Pact with the Nazis. This aimed at Russia, giving a further link with European fascism and qualified security for Japan's aggression against China. School children were indoctrinated obsessively with the creed of Japanese nationalism. Belief in the superiority of the Yamato race was officially promoted and generally accepted. Many Japanese felt that their country's cause was just and that first Manchuria and then China should properly submit to Japanese management. There was a clear appeal in the Japanese ‘Greater east Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' with Japan providing the technical and managerial skills and the rest of East Asia providing the raw materials and labour.

Given the combination of the economic depression, the fear of Communism, the feeling that the West had turned against Japan, there was a strong feeling that the country needed was strong, authoritarian government and aggressive military build-up – the defense state. It left no place for dissidents and centred on reverence for the emperor as the national symbol. Patriotic societies urged for unqualified support for the military. Secret ultra-nationalist societies were increased and advocated and used violence to advance their objectives.

The easy success of the Manchurian takeover in 1931 brought general exhilaration at home. Military buildup stimulated the economy, including the conscription of many more soldiers, mainly peasants from the rural sector, and helped Japan to recover from the depression.

Without any very clear long-term objectives (not necessarily planning to conquer the country) , the Japanese only wanted China to submit to their direction. Japanese terror tactics failed to persuade the Chinese to give up. It was Chinese resistance which made that necessary. Massive Japanese mis-calculation of the strength of Chinese nationalism as well as the enormity of the task which defeated them in the end. The China Incident hardened the Chinese will to resist.

Why so brutal?

It had always be queried what then was the reason for the complete breakdown of discipline in an army. Many answers have been put forward: -

a) the way of the Samurai

The samurai are known as strong and courageous warriors, schooled with swords. In reality for two centuries they were idle rather than fighting against enemies on the battlefield.

But it's the ideals to which they aspired — holding discipline, bravery loyalty, and benevolence above life itself — that endured and shaped the romantic image of the samurai that had ingrained in the Japanese cultural psyche. Ritual suicide by disembowelment (seppuku) was institutionalised as a respected alternative to dishonour or defeat.

When the dawn of the Meiji era came as a time of change for Japan which had emerged from 200 years of self-imposed isolation, and shed some of its traditions. The samurai had served as a standing army with no one to fight for the last 200 years. Now they represented the past.

The samurai class lost its privileged position when feudalism was officially abolished in 1871. discontented former samurai rose in rebellion several times during the 1870d, but these revolts were quickly suppressed by the newly established national army.

b) a deliberately planned act of terror to force Chiang Kai-shek's
government into submission

According to the Japanese policy during the ‘Chinese incident', it was
instructed to take no prisoners. From the moment they landed, Japanese
troops were told to ‘clear up' captured soldiers as they fought their way
up to Nanking.

As there was a lot of guerrilla warfare, the Japanese made no distinctions
between soldiers and civilians.

c) a massive letting off of steam by brutalized battle-weary troops
Japanese soldiers were said to be often brutalized by ill treatment from their
own superior officers. All Chinese were enemies in their eyes, including women and children. It was just simpler just to kill then than to feed them.

The Japanese believed that to achieve mastery, they have to continuously fight for world domination. Because they are fighting for a higher order, a sacred mission is ordained by the gods, so everything else is ancillary. Obedience to the Emperor is pre-eminent. Japanese soldiers have been trained and conditioned in their minds that pain and suffering are immaterial for this struggle. This conflict resulted in torment and affliction to those who obstruct its path and its completion.

Any obstacles are taught to be brutally oppressed, not only for its enemies but themselves. The indoctrination emphasis is on group loyalty and disregard of the individual, with a willingness to sacrifice their own lives for Japan and the Emperor. To be captured and become a prisoner of war is regarded as being shameful to the highest degree. His mission is more important than his own life or his family.

To conclude this essay aims to understand what happened before and during the Second Sino-Japanese War which is not the same as seeking to justify or explain the way that things happened. Were the Japanese justified in their unquestioning obedience, their acquiescence in their leaders' military aggression need hardly to be judged. There is no denying that during the 1930s and early 1940s, Japanese politics became undemocratic, militaristic and aggressive. Those responsible for the running of the country did inflict untold misery on all the many millions of people who found themselves caught up in the Pacific War.

Finally do you agree to what has been described as ‘five withouts' in Japanese society –

‧ wealth without joy
‧ education without creativity
‧ material equality without individual freedom
‧ familyism without genuine family life
‧ great power status without great power leadership

Source:
Inventing Japan 1853-1964 by Ian Buruma
East Asia: A New History by Rhoads Murphey
Japan, 1868-1945 From Isolation to Occupation by John Benson and
Takao Matsumura